The form of government in the Roman Constitution of 1849

La forma de gobierno en la Constitución Romana de 1849

A “quasi dualistic” or “unbalanced dualism” institutional form emerges from the 1849 Roman Constitution. It envisages a separation of the powers that, however, disallowed the ex post influence of one body over the function of the other, therefore one of the two constitutional bodies was “impaired”: the collegial President of the Republic, although a direct participant in the legislative function, could not exercise the suspensive veto (accompanied by the presidential observations), but only enact the law “without delay”. The Assembly appointed the collegial President of the Republic; the three consuls could not be selected from the members of parliament, so the separation of the two most important constitutional actors was set in stone. The collegial President of the Republic was the head of the Government. He was responsible for appointing and revoking the office of the ministers, who were tied to the consular power by an “internal” relationship of trust, but this relationship of trust could not be established between the Consular-Government and the Assembly. The two powers, Legislative and Head of State-Executive, were constituted in two distinct centres of authority, contrived in such a unique form that can be defined as “quasi dualistic”. The institution of the countersignature established the principle of the “non-liability of the Consuls”, but in what way would the Constitution have guaranteed the lack of responsibility of the (collegial) President of the Republic if the exact opposite is affirmed in articles 43, 44, 45 and 55? Is it difficult to imagine an evolution towards parliamentarism? In other words, would legal liability have paved the way for political responsibility and, therefore, the parliamentary system?